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Although quantum mechanics is one of our most successful physical theories, there has been a
long-standing debate about the interpretation of the wave function—the central object of the theory.
Two prominent views are that (i) it corresponds to an element of reality, i.e. an objective attribute
that exists before measurement, and (ii) it is a subjective state of knowledge about some underlying
reality. A recent result [Pusey et al. arXiv:1111.3328] has placed the subjective interpretation into
doubt, showing that it would contradict certain physically plausible assumptions, in particular that
multiple systems can be prepared such that their elements of reality are uncorrelated. Here we
show, based only on the assumption that measurement settings can be chosen freely, that a system’s
wave function is in one-to-one correspondence with its elements of reality. This also eliminates the
possibility that it can be interpreted subjectively.
PACS numbers: 03.65.-w, 03.65.Ud, 03.67.-a
Introduction.—Given the wave function associated
with a physical system, quantum theory allows us to
compute predictions for the outcomes of any measure-
ment. Since a wave function corresponds to an extremal
state and is therefore maximally informative, one possible
view is that it can be considered an element of reality of
the system, i.e., an objective attribute that exists before
measurement. However, an alternative view, often moti-
vated by the probabilistic nature of quantum predictions,
is that the wave function represents incomplete (subjec-
tive) knowledge about some underlying reality. Which
view one adopts affects how one thinks about the theory
at a fundamental level.
To illuminate the difference between the above views,
we give an illustrative example. Consider a meteorolo-
gist who gives a prediction about tomorrow’s weather (for
example that it will be sunny with probability 33%, and
cloudy with probability 67%; see left hand side of Fig. 1).
We may assume that classical mechanics accurately de-
scribes the relevant processes, so that the weather de-
pends deterministically on the initial conditions. The
fact that the prediction is probabilistic then solely re-
flects a lack of knowledge on the part of the meteorol-
ogist on these conditions. In particular, the forecast is
not an element of reality associated with the atmosphere,
but rather reflects the subjective knowledge of the fore-
caster; a second meteorologist with different knowledge
(see right hand side of Fig. 1) may issue an alternative
forecast.
Moving to quantum mechanics, one may ask whether
the wave function Ψ that we assign to a quantum system
should be seen as a subjective object (analogous to the
weather forecast) representing the knowledge an experi-
menter has about the system, or whether Ψ is an element
of reality of the system (analogous to the weather being
sunny). This question has been the subject of a long
debate, which goes back to the early days of quantum
theory [1].
The debate originated from the fact that quantum
theory is inherently probabilistic: even with a full de-
scription of a system’s wave function, the theory does
not allow us to predict the outcomes of future measure-
ments with certainty. This fact is often used to motivate
subjective interpretations of quantum theory, such as
the Copenhagen interpretation [2–4], according to which
wave functions are mere mathematical objects that allow
us to calculate probabilities of future events.
Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) advocated the
view that the wave function does not provide a complete
physical description of reality [5], and that a higher, com-
plete theory is possible. In such a complete theory, any
element of reality must have a counterpart in the the-
ory. Were quantum theory not complete, it could be
that the higher theory has additional parameters that
complement the wave function. The wave function could
then be objective, i.e., uniquely determined by the ele-
ments of reality of the higher theory. Alternatively, the
wave function could take the role of a state of knowledge
about the underlying parameters of the higher theory. In
this case, the wave function would not be uniquely deter-
mined by these parameters and would therefore admit a
subjective interpretation. To connect to some terminol-
ogy in the literature (see for example Ref. 6), in the first
case the underlying model would be called ψ-ontic, and
in the second case ψ-epistemic. For some recent work in
support of a ψ-epistemic view, see for example Refs. 7–9.
In some famous works from the 1960s, several con-
straints were placed on higher descriptions given in terms
of hidden variables [10–12], and further constraints have
since been highlighted [13–15]. In addition, we have
recently shown [16] that, under the assumption of free
choice, if quantum theory is correct then it is non-
extendible, in the sense of being maximally informative
about measurement outcomes.
Very recently, Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph [17] have
presented an argument showing that a subjective inter-
pretation of the wave function would violate certain plau-
sible assumptions. Specifically, their argument refers to
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2FIG. 1: Simple example illustrating the ideas. Two meteorologists attempt to predict tomorrow’s weather (whether it
will be sunny or cloudy in a particular location). Both have access to historical data giving the joint distribution of the weather
on successive days. However, only the meteorologist on the left has access to today’s weather, and consequently the two make
different probabilistic forecasts, F and F ′. Assuming that the processes relevant to the weather are accurately described by
classical mechanics and thus deterministic, the list of elements of reality, Λ, may include tomorrow’s weather, X. Such a list Λ
would then necessarily satisfy Γ↔ Λ↔ X (for any arbitrary Γ) and therefore be complete (cf. Eq. 1). However, the analogue
of Eq. 2, Λ ↔ F ↔ X would imply X ↔ F ↔ X. This Markov chain cannot hold for the non-deterministic forecasts F and
F ′, which are hence not complete. This is unlike the quantum-mechanical wave function, which gives a complete description
for the prediction of measurement outcomes. Note that this difference explains why, in contrast to the quantum-mechanical
wave function, F and F ′ need not be included in Λ and can therefore be considered subjective.
a model where each physical system possesses an individ-
ual set of (possibly hidden) elements of reality, which are
the only quantities relevant for predicting the outcomes
of later measurements. One of their assumptions then
demands that it is possible to prepare multiple systems
such that these sets are statistically independent.
Here, we present a totally different argument to show
that the wave function of a quantum system is fully deter-
mined by its elements of reality. In fact, this implies that
the wave function is in one-to-one correspondence with
these elements of reality (see the Conclusions) and may
therefore itself be considered an element of reality of the
system. These claims are derived under minimal assump-
tions, namely that the statistical predictions of existing
quantum theory are correct, and that measurement set-
tings can (in principle) be chosen freely. In terms of the
language of Ref. 6, this means that any model of reality
consistent with quantum theory and with free choice is
ψ-complete.
General Model.—In order to state our result, we con-
sider a general experiment where a system S is prepared
in a state specified by a wave function Ψ (see Fig. 2).
Then an experimenter chooses a measurement setting A
(specified by an observable or a family of projectors) and
records the measurement outcome, denoted X. Mathe-
matically, we model Ψ as a random variable over the set
of wave functions, A as a random variable over the set of
observables, and X as a random variable over the set of
possible measurement outcomes. Finally, we introduce
a collection of random variables, denoted Γ, which are
intended to model all information that is (in principle)
available before the measurement setting, A, is chosen
and the measurement is carried out. Technically, we only
require that Γ includes the wave function Ψ. In the fol-
lowing, when we refer to a list of elements of reality, we
simply mean a subset Λ of Γ. Furthermore, we say that
Λ is complete for the description of the system S if any
possible prediction about the outcome X of a measure-
ment A on S can be obtained from Λ, i.e., we demand
that the Markov condition
Γ↔ (Λ, A)↔ X (1)
holds 1. Note that, using this definition, the aforemen-
tioned result on the non-extendibility of quantum the-
ory [16] can be phrased as: The wave function Ψ asso-
1 U ↔ V ↔ W is called a Markov chain if PU|V=v =
PU|V=v,W=w or, equivalently, if PW |V=v = PW |V=v,U=u, for
all u, v, w with strictly positive joint probability. Here and in
the following, we use upper case letters for random variables,
and lower case letters for specific values they can take.
3FIG. 2: Illustration of the setup. A system is prepared
in a particular quantum state (specified by a wave function
Ψ). The elements of reality, Λ, may depend on this prepa-
ration. A measurement setting, A, is then randomly chosen,
and the system is measured, producing an outcome, X. We
assume that Λ is complete for the description of the system, in
the sense that there does not exist any other parameter that
provides additional information (beyond that contained in Λ)
about the outcome of any chosen measurement. In particu-
lar, Ψ cannot provide more information than Λ. Conversely,
the non-extendibility of quantum theory [16] implies that Λ
cannot provide more information (about the outcome) than
Ψ. Taken together, these statements imply that Ψ and Λ are
informationally equivalent. From this and the fact that differ-
ent quantum states generally lead to different measurement
statistics, we conclude that Ψ must be included in the list Λ
and is therefore an element of reality of the system.
ciated with a system S is complete for the description of
S.
We are now ready to formulate our main technical
claim.
Theorem.—Any list of elements of reality, Λ, that is
complete for the description of a system S includes the
quantum-mechanical wave function Ψ associated with S
(in the sense that Ψ is uniquely determined by Λ).
Assumptions.— The above claim is derived under the
following two assumptions, which are usually implicit in
the literature. (We note that very similar assumptions
are also made in Ref. 17, where, as already mentioned,
an additional statistical independence assumption is also
used.)
• Correctness of quantum theory: Quantum the-
ory gives the correct statistical predictions.
For example, the distribution of X satisfies
PX|Ψ=ψ,A=a(x) = 〈ψ|Πax|ψ〉, where Πax denotes the
projector corresponding to outcome X = x of the
measurement specified by A = a.
• Freedom of choice: Measurement settings can be
chosen to be independent of any pre-existing value
(in any frame) 2. In particular, this implies that
the setting A can be chosen independently of Γ,
i.e., PA|Γ=γ = PA 3.
We note that the proof of our result relies on an argument
presented in Ref. 16, where these assumptions are also
used (see the Supplemental Material for more details).
Proof of the main claim.— As shown in Ref. 16, under
the above assumptions, Ψ is complete for the description
of S. Since Λ is included in Γ, we have in particular
Λ↔ (Ψ, A)↔ X . (2)
Our argument then proceeds as follows. The above con-
dition is equivalent to the requirement that
PX|Λ=λ,Ψ=ψ,A=a = PX|Ψ=ψ,A=a
holds for all λ, ψ, a that have a positive joint probability,
i.e., PΛΨA(λ, ψ, a) > 0. Furthermore, because of the as-
sumption that Λ is a complete list of elements of reality,
Eq. 1, and because Ψ is by definition included in Γ, we
have
PX|Λ=λ,Ψ=ψ,A=a = PX|Λ=λ,A=a .
Combining these expressions gives
PX|Ψ=ψ,A=a = PX|Λ=λ,A=a , (3)
for all values λ, ψ, a with PΛΨA(λ, ψ, a) > 0. Note
that, using the free choice assumption, we have PΛΨA =
PΛΨ×PA, hence this condition is equivalent to demand-
ing PΛΨ(λ, ψ) > 0 and PA(a) > 0.
Now consider some fixed Λ = λ and suppose that there
exist two states, ψ0 and ψ1, such that PΛΨ(λ, ψ0) > 0 and
PΛΨ(λ, ψ1) > 0. From Eq. 3, this implies PX|Ψ=ψ0,A=a =
PX|Ψ=ψ1,A=a for all a such that PA(a) > 0. However,
within quantum theory, it is easy to choose the set of
measurements for which PA(a) > 0 such that this can
only be satisfied if ψ0 = ψ1. This holds, for example,
if the set of measurements is tomographically complete.
Thus, for each Λ = λ, there exists only one possible value
of Ψ = ψ such that PΛΨ(λ, ψ) > 0, i.e., Ψ is uniquely
determined by Λ, which is what we set out to prove.
Discussion and Conclusions.—We have shown that the
quantum wave function can be taken to be an element of
reality of a system based on two assumptions, the cor-
rectness of quantum theory and the freedom of choice for
2 This assumption, while often implicit, is for instance discussed
(and used) in Bell’s work. In Ref. 19, he writes that “the settings
of instruments are in some sense free variables . . . [which] means
that the values of such variables have implications only in their
future light cones.” This leads directly to the freedom of choice
assumption as formulated here. We refer to the Supplemental
Material for a more detailed discussion.
3 In Ref. 17, this assumption corresponds to the requirement that
a quantum system can be freely prepared according to one of a
number of predefined states.
4measurement settings. Both of these assumptions are in
principle experimentally falsifiable (see the Supplemental
Material for a discussion of possible experiments).
The correctness of quantum theory is a natural as-
sumption given that we are asking whether the quantum
wave function is an element of reality of a system. Fur-
thermore, a free choice assumption is necessary to show
that the answer is yes. Without free choice, A would be
pre-determined and the complete list of elements of real-
ity, Λ, could be chosen to consist of the single element X.
In this case, Eq. 1 would be trivially satisfied. Neverthe-
less, since the list Λ = {X} does not uniquely determine
the wave function, Ψ, we could not consider Ψ to be an
element of reality of the system. This shows that the
wave function would admit a subjective interpretation if
the free choice assumption was dropped.
We conclude by noting that, given any complete list of
elements of reality, Λ, the non-extendibility of quantum
theory, Eq. 2, asserts that any information contained in
Λ that may be relevant for predicting measurement out-
comes X is already contained in the wave function Ψ.
Conversely, the result shown here is that Ψ is included
in Λ. Since these are two seemingly opposite statements,
it is somewhat intriguing that the second can be inferred
from the first, as shown in this Letter. Furthermore,
taken together, the two statements imply that Ψ is in
one-to-one correlation to Λ. This sheds new light on a
question dating back to the early days of quantum the-
ory [18], asking whether the wave function is in one-to-
one correlation with physical reality. Interpreting Λ as
the state of physical reality (or the ontic state), our re-
sult asserts that, under the free choice assumption, the
answer to this question is yes.
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5SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
I. ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION OF THE
ASSUMPTIONS
Our work relies on two assumptions, which we discuss
in separate subsections. We note that these assumptions
are essentially those already used in [16], upon which this
work builds.
For the following exposition, it is convenient to in-
troduce the concept of spacetime variables (SVs) [16].
Mathematically, these are simply random variables
(which take values from an arbitrary set) together with
associated coordinates (t, r1, r2, r3) ∈ R4. A SV may be
interpreted physically as a value that is accessible at the
spacetime point specified by these coordinates (with re-
spect to a given reference frame).
The variables described in the main text, A, X, and
Γ, can readily be modelled as SVs. In particular, the co-
ordinates of A should specify the spacetime point where
the measurement setting (for measuring the system S) is
chosen. Accordingly, the coordinates of X correspond to
an (arbitrary) point in the spacetime region where the
measurement outcome is available. We therefore assign
coordinates such that X is in the future lightcone of A,
whereas no SV in the set Γ (which models any informa-
tion available before the measurement) should lie in the
future lightcone of A.
A. Correctness of quantum theory
This assumption refers to the statistical predictions
about measurement outcomes that can be made within
standard quantum theory (i.e., it does not make refer-
ence to any additional parameters of a potential higher
theory4). Following the treatment in [16], we subdivide
the assumption into two parts.
• QMa: Consider a system whose state is described
by a wave function, Ψ, corresponding to an element
of a Hilbert space HS . According to quantum the-
ory, any measurement setting A = a is specified
by a family of projectors, {Πax}x, parameterized by
the possible outcomes x, such that
∑
x Π
a
x = 1HS .
5
The assumption demands that the probability of
obtaining output X = x when the system is mea-
sured with setting A = a is given by
PX|A=a(x) = tr(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|Πax) .
4 In particular, in a higher theory that has additional hidden pa-
rameters, the predictions of quantum theory should be recovered
if these parameters are ignored, which corresponds mathemati-
cally to averaging over them.
5 Naimark’s dilation theorem asserts that any measurement spec-
ified by a Positive Operator Valued Measure can be seen as a
projective measurement on a larger Hilbert space.
• QMb: Consider again a measurement as in As-
sumption QMa described by projectors {Πax}x on
HS . According to quantum theory, for any fixed
choice of the setting A = a0, the measurement can
be modelled as an isometry ES→SE from states on
HS to states on a larger system HS⊗HE (involving
parts of the measurement apparatus and the envi-
ronment) such that the restriction of ES→SE to the
original system corresponds to the initial measure-
ment, i.e., formally
trEES→SE(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|) =
∑
x
Πa0x |Ψ〉〈Ψ|Πa0x ,
where trE denotes the partial trace over HE [20].
The assumption then demands that for all A = a
and for any measurement (defined by a family of
projectors, {Πby}y, parameterized by the possible
outcomes y) carried out on system E, the joint
statistics of the outcomes are given by
PXY |A=a,B=b(x, y) = tr
(ES→SE(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|)Πax ⊗Πby) .
Note that both assumptions refer to the Born rule [2]
for the probability distribution of measurement out-
comes. In Assumption QMa, the rule is applied to a mea-
surement on a single system, whereas Assumption QMb
demands that the rule also applies to the joint proba-
bility distribution involving the outcome of (arbitrary)
additional measurements.
B. Freedom of choice
The assumption that measurement settings can be cho-
sen freely is often left implicit in the literature. This is
also true, for example, for large parts of Bell’s work, al-
though he later mentioned the assumption explicitly [19].
The notion of freedom of choice can be expressed math-
ematically using the language of SVs. We say that a SV
A is free with respect to a set of SVs Ω if
PAΩ′ = PA × PΩ′
holds, where Ω′ is the set of all SVs from Ω whose coor-
dinates lie outside the future lightcone of A. This cap-
tures the idea that A should be independent of any “pre-
existing” values (with respect to any reference frame).
This definition is motivated by the following notion of
causality. For two SVs A and B, we say that B could
have been caused by A if and only if B lies in the future
lightcone of A. Within a relativistic spacetime structure,
this is equivalent to requiring the time coordinate of B
to be larger than that of A in all reference frames. Using
this notion of causality, our definition that A is free with
respect to Ω is equivalent to demanding that all SVs in
Ω that are correlated to A could have been caused by A.
6Connecting to the main text, we note that (by defini-
tion) all SVs in the set Γ defined there lie outside the fu-
ture lightcone of the spacetime point where the measure-
ment setting A is chosen. The requirement for A to be
free with respect to Γ thus simply reads PAΓ = PA×PΓ.
In Ref. 16 (upon which the present result is based), the
free choice assumption is used in a more general bipar-
tite scenario. There, two measurements are carried out
at spacelike separation, one of which has setting A and
outcome X and the other has setting B and outcome Y .
In addition, as in our main argument, we consider ar-
bitrary additional (pre-existing) information Γ. The as-
sumption that A and B are chosen freely (i.e., such that
they are uncorrelated with any variables in their past in
any frame) then corresponds mathematically to the re-
quirements PA|BY Γ = PA and PB|AXΓ = PB . We remark
that these conditions are not obeyed in the de Broglie-
Bohm model [21, 22] if one includes the wave function as
well as the hidden particle trajectories in Γ.
It is also worth making a few additional remarks about
the connection to other work. As mentioned in the main
text, in Ref. 19, Bell writes that “the settings of instru-
ments are in some sense free variables . . . [which] means
that the values of such variables have implications only
in their future light cones.” When formalized, this gives
the above definition. However, in spite of the motiva-
tion given in the above quote, the mathematical expres-
sion Bell writes down corresponds to a weaker notion
that only requires free choices to be independent of pre-
existing hidden parameters (but does not include pre-
existing measurement outcomes). This weaker require-
ment is (as he acknowledges) a particular implication of
the full freedom of choice assumption. We imagine that
the reason for Bell’s reference to this weaker implica-
tion is that it is sufficient for his purpose when combined
with another assumption, known as local causality. In-
deed, the weaker implication of free choice together with
Bell’s local causality are also sufficient to prove our re-
sult. Furthermore, in the literature the weaker notion is
sometimes taken to be the definition of free choice, rather
than an implication of it.
II. CONNECTION TO EXPERIMENT
Our main argument is based on the assumption that
measurement outcomes obey the statistical predictions
of quantum theory, and it is interesting to consider how
closely experimental observations come to obeying these
predictions. For the argument in Ref. 16, which leads to
Eq. 2 in the main text, this assumption is divided into
two parts, as mentioned above.
The first part of the assumption has already been sub-
ject to experimental investigation (see Refs. 23, 24), giv-
ing results compatible with quantum theory to within
experimental tolerance. Note that, although no experi-
mental result can establish the Markov chain condition of
Eq. 2 precisely, the observed data can be used to bound
how close (in trace distance) the Markov chain condition
is to holding (see Ref. 24 for more details).
The second part of the assumption has not seen much
experimental attention to date. However, were we to ever
discover a measurement procedure that is demonstrably
inconsistent with unitary dynamics on the microscopic
scale, this would falsify the assumption and point to new
physics.
The freedom of choice assumption is more difficult
to probe experimentally, since it is stated in terms of
Γ, which is information in a hypothetical higher theory.
Nevertheless, it would be possible to falsify the assump-
tion in specific cases, for example using a device capable
of predicting the measurement settings before they were
chosen.
